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Abstract 
This paper re-examines the use of estimated Taylor rule equations as a standard long run 
description of Federal Reserve policy. The empirical results suggest that until 1979 Fed policy 
changed the real funds rate in response to the output gap, with no response to an inflation 
target. During the Volcker period the policy rule kept the real funds rate at a high but constant 
level, with no response to the output gap. These regime shifts affect the descriptive 
performance of the basic Taylor rule equation and any further analysis that is based on it. 
Taking into account the regime shifts and real time data, a simple but effective federal funds 
rate equation can be estimated using only inflation and the output gap. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is and has been a long-time interest in central bank’s reaction functions, or, in modern 
parlance, estimated policy rules. Modelling monetary policy reaction functions is important 
for a variety of reasons. For example, financial market practitioners need to understand 
policymaking in order to make sound forecasts of future monetary policy and to evaluate the 
likely direction of future financial market prices. Macroeconomists require a reaction function 
to endogenize policy in macroeconomic models. Many empirical analyses of economic 
theories depend on expected values of future variables that are linked to monetary policy, for 
example, the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. 
 
Unfortunately, estimating central bank reaction functions has turned out to be complicated. 
The literature provides many studies, for many countries, containing mixed or contradictory 
results with respect to the significance of variables and the sign and size of coefficients.
1
 
There are several reasons for the empirical difficulties with estimated policy rules. First, in 
practice, policy decision makers tend to look at ‘everything’ and the range of possible 
explanatory variables is very large, both in scope and in their precise measurement. For a long 
time, economists were also strongly divided on how to actually measure the stance of 
monetary policy, arguing for or against alternative definitions of money and some specific 
policy interest rate.
2
 Furthermore, policy decisions are probably asymmetric and non-linear, 
giving different weights to variables under different economic circumstances.
3
 Also, policy 
regimes are subject to more fundamental structural breaks, for example related to changes in 
policy targets, leading to multiple periods, each with consistent but different policy making. 
 
Since the seminal work of Taylor (1993) monetary economists have converged on the so-
called Taylor rule as a fundamental framework for most monetary policy descriptions. The 
Taylor rule simplifies the policy reaction function and focuses on two key economic variables 
that determine central bank policy interest rates: inflation relative to an inflation target 
(inflation gap) and the real economy relative to its long-run equilibrium (output gap or 
unemployment gap). These two variables are closely linked to the main goals of 
macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, focusing on these two indicator variables has been 
shown to provide a robust and reasonably efficient monetary policy in a wide variety of 
alternative economic models. More importantly from a practical viewpoint, the Taylor rule 
has shown to be a reasonably accurate description of monetary policy in several countries, at 
least for more recent time periods starting somewhere in the 1980s.
4
 Today, the Taylor rule 
has become a standard component of macroeconomic analyses, exemplified by the frequently 
used 3-equation small macroeconomic model (for example, Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) 
                                                 
1 For the U.S., Khoury (1990) found that there appeared to be little consistency in the results for the various 
explanatory variables. Smant (2002) provides a survey of studies of Deutsche Bundesbank reaction functions, 
with similar results. 
2 Although consensus has settled on the money market interest rate as the appropriate measure of monetary 
policy, technically this is an assumption that depends on the structure of the market of bank reserves and the 
operating procedures selected by the central bank. See Bernanke and Mihov (1998). Incorrect identification of 
policy actions can result in seriously misleading empirical results, although the problem is most severe for high 
frequency (daily, weekly) data. 
3 For example, Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) stress the time-changing behaviour of many central banks, 
switching between their inflation and real economy objectives. 
4 A cautionary note is that several monetary policy strategies can be shown to result in Taylor-type equations 
linking the interest rate with inflation and the output gap. Therefore, although the Taylor rule may work as a 
description of monetary policies, we cannot conclude that policy makers actually have implemented the Taylor 
rule as a specific strategy. 
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and the structural interpretation of the short-term interest rate in VAR models (for example, 
McCallum, 1983). 
 
Despite its appeal of simplicity, however, using the Taylor rule as a unified description of 
monetary policy over long time periods without taking into account structural breaks can have 
serious consequences. One specific example is the use of VAR models in tests of the 
expectations theory of interest rates. The VAR models are frequently used to generate interest 
rate forecasts and to test theoretical restrictions on the model.
5
 Problems arise when the policy 
rule embedded in the model is inaccurate and does not reflect actual policy behaviour and/or 
financial market expectations of it. For example, Fuhrer (1996) reports that the performance 
of this type of model and tests is seriously affected by the presence of structural breaks in the 
short-term interest rate equation. By taking into account monetary policy regime changes the 
relationship between the actually observed long-term interest rate and its theoretical value 
derived from forecasted monetary policy rates can be dramatically improved. Consequently, 
empirical failures of the expectations theory reported in many empirical studies may be 
related more to failing interest rate forecasting models than to a failure of the tested theory 
itself. Other examples of potential problems related to monetary policy regime shifts can be 
found in empirical tests based on long-run cointegration models that include the short-term 
interest rate. One such example relates to long-run tests of the Fisher hypothesis (for example, 
the approach suggested by Mehra, 1998). 
  
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the use of the estimated Taylor rule as a simple 
standard long-run monetary policy reaction function in macroeconomic analyses. I will 
largely follow Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and estimate Taylor rule functions for periods 
linked to various Chairmen of the Federal Reserve. The subperiod estimates do indeed exhibit 
important regime shifts. The various regimes have simple but economically plausible 
interpretations. Finally, the three different policy regimes are unified in a simple but effective 
Taylor-type reaction function that covers the full period under review and provides an 
accurate description of Federal Reserve policy over the period 1969-2009. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of 
important issues in the estimation of policy rules. Section 3 discusses the empirical estimates. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. ISSUES IN ESTIMATING TAYLOR RULES 
 
The basic Taylor (1993) equation is 
 
ty
T
ttt yri βππβπ π +−++= )(
*  
 
where i, r*, π, π
T
, and y denote the federal funds rate (policy rate), the equilibrium real federal 
funds rate, inflation rate, target inflation rate and the output gap. Coefficients βπ and βy are the 
policy response coefficients to the inflation gap and the output gap. Taylor (1993) assumed 
for βπ and βy values of 0.5 and also assumed for r* and π
T
 values of 2 percent, which seemed 
appropriate for Federal Reserve policy during the period 1987-1992. 
 
                                                 
5 These tests follow the methodology proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1987). 
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When estimating the Taylor rule coefficients as a description of actual monetary policy, the 
literature over time has identified several issues that need to be addressed.  
 
Real time data 
At least since the work of Orphanides (2001) the estimated policy rule literature has seen an 
increased emphasis on using real-time datasets.
6
 Not only do we need to consider carefully 
the fact that official economic statistics become available after the reporting period, but, more 
importantly, some statistics are subject to major revisions, for example when at future 
moments in time additional source material becomes available and when definitions and 
statistical procedures are changed. An important part of this paper has been to collect a real 
time database to estimate the Fed’s historical policy rule. Specifically, the real time data I use 
in this study are ‘first release’ data. By using the first released values for a given reporting 
period, I ignore publication lags, which have varied somewhat over time, and make the 
assumption that Federal Reserve staff is able to predict contemporaneous values of the 
variables using a variety of leading indicators available to them. 
 
Inflation 
Inflation in the Taylor rule is most commonly measured by the annual change in the aggregate 
price index, Q/Q-4 or M/M-12. Somewhat more contentious is the precise measure of the 
aggregate price level that should be used. Reviews of Fed policy suggest that the Fed’s 
preferred inflation measure has changed over time. Historically the Fed used the GNP and 
later GDP deflator. In the February 2000 Monetary Policy Report to Congress the Fed’s 
emphasis changed to the PCE chain-type index. And in July 2004 the emphasis changed to the 
core-PCE index (i.e, excl. food and energy). The headline CPI appears not to have been in 
favour with Fed policy makers although it featured in policy discussions with the U.S. 
Administration and Congress. 
 
Following Taylor (1993), I use the current and thus revised data for the GDP deflator in one 
set of estimations that aims to represent usual practice. In the second part of the analysis, 
using real time data, the definition of inflation is period specific. Real time inflation data are 
for the GNP/GDP deflator until 1999Q4, PCE chain-type index from 2000Q1, and core-PCE 
from 2004Q2.  
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the inflation data. Figure 1 shows that 
generally the difference between the current and real time inflation data is not very large. 
Larger differences between the two data series existed during the early 1970s and the mid 
2000s, where in both cases the GDP deflator inflation was substantially lower. 
 
                                                 
6 Other important contributions to the real-time data literature are Runkle (1998), Keane and Runkle (1990), 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1991) and Croushore and Stark (1999). 
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FIGURE 1 Comparison of current and real-time inflation 
inflation Q/Q-4
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Note: Current PGDP Q/Q-4 inflation is based on the current GDP chain-type price index (vintage August 2010). 
Real-time inflation data are first release data and reflect changes in Fed emphasis on GNP/GDP, PCE and PCE-
core. 
 
 
Output gap 
The output gap has a long history in U.S. economic policy and was first introduced in the 
early 1960s as part of policy analysis by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). Official 
estimates were subsequently published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as responsibility for producing the government estimates 
was rearranged over time. The Federal Reserve has also produced its own estimates in 
preparation for the regular FOMC policy discussions, but the data contained in the Greenbook 
start at a much later date and are only available with a substantial lag.
7
 One important 
problem with the output gap variable is that potential or trend output is unobserved and must 
be estimated. Various methods of potential output estimation have been used in the literature, 
such as fitted linear trends, quadratic trends, segmented trends, moving average or filter 
methods and structural or production function methods. Gap estimates vary widely between 
the various methods. Most importantly, the available evidence shows that the (quasi-) official 
estimates of potential output have changed drastically over time, re-emphasizing the 
importance of using real time data in policy descriptions.  
 
I use a reproduction of real-time potential output and output gap values based on the historical 
analyses made by the CEA, BEA and CBO. Information available at the start of every year is 
used to construct an expected quarterly time series for expected potential output during that 
year. These estimates of expected potential output are then matched with the first release data 
on actual real GNP and GDP to create a real time series of the estimated output gap.  
 
                                                 
7 For a brief discussion of output gap measures see Orphanides (2003). It has been argued that historically the 
Fed has not actually used the output gap but tended to focus more on the unemployment gap. However, 
Orphanides found that the output gap did feature in the FOMC policy discussions. He also found that official 
estimates and Federal Reserve staff estimates of the output gap were generally close. 
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Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of the output gap data. Figure 2 shows the now 
familiar fact that historically, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s, real-time 
perceptions of the U.S. output gap were substantially more negative than they are today. 
Obviously these different perceptions should be taken into account when we are re-examining 
historical policy decisions. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Comparison of current and real-time output gap 
output gap
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Note: Current output gap data are based on the CBO potential output estimate (vintage August 2010). Real-time 
output gap data are based on first-release GNP/GDP data and potential output estimates of the CEA, BEA and 
CBO. 
 
 
Equilibrium r* and π
T
 
The Taylor rule includes an important role for the equilibrium real interest rate and the 
inflation target, both of which are in the case of the U.S. Fed not directly observed. For some 
other countries, such as Germany, central banks have long published inflation targets which 
could be used in the estimated policy rule. More commonly, r* and π
T
 are estimated indirectly 
as part of the intercept of an estimated Taylor equation. Of course, this approach is only valid 
if we can assume that both r* and π
T
 are on average constant over the sample period. The 
literature on both real interest rates and monetary policy’s historical struggle with periods of 
inflation and deflation suggests that constancy is a heroic assumption and a likely cause of 
structural breaks in the estimated policy rule. In the absence of further independent 
information on equilibrium real interest rates and U.S. policy inflation targets the best way to 
approach the problem appears to be to examine subperiods for the implied inflation target. 
 
Further specification issues 
Besides the question of possible additional information variables, some economists have 
suggested that real world monetary policy is (or should be) more forward looking than the 
basic Taylor rule. Specifically, policy makers may respond to expected inflation and/or the 
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expected output gap. However, limited data availability usually prevents an appropriate 
examination of this issue.
8
 
 
Another specification issue that has appeared in the literature is the possibility of smoothing 
and momentum effects in the policy target rate and the presence of partial adjustment 
dynamics in the policy rate.
9
 Although it is, for example, common to include lagged policy 
rates in the policy rule, interpretation of the empirical results is confounded by the possibility 
of autocorrelated shocks and autocorrelated missing indicator variables.  
 
The previous comments suggest that there is much room for debate on the appropriate details 
of any estimated policy rule. Without wanting to belittle any of the issues, the empirical 
analysis in the next section will take a simple approach. The objective is to obtain a simple 
but general characterization of the main policy features, using only inflation and the output 
gap as the major explanatory variables. The objective is not to obtain a complete description 
of policy actions on a high data frequency. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this paper I follow Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and proceed under the assumption that the 
Fed’s policy rule is affected by changes in the Fed Chairman. Table 1 presents the various 
tenures of Fed Chairmen, starting in the early 1950. 
 
 
Table 1 Federal Reserve Chairmen 
Chairman Tenure 
William M. Martin, Jr.  
Arthur F. Burns 
G. William Miller  
Paul A. Volcker   
Alan Greenspan   
Ben S. Bernanke  
Apr 1951 – Jan 1970 
Feb 1970 – Jan 1978 
Mar 1978 – Aug 1979 
Aug 1979 – Aug 1987 
Aug 1987 – Jan 2006 
Feb 2006 - 
 
 
Judd and Rudebusch found that their sample of quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 1997Q4 can be 
divided into three structurally different regimes, with the subperiods identified by the terms of 
Chairmen Burns (1970Q1-1978Q1), Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Greenspan (1987Q3-
1997Q4). The Miller term (1978Q2-1979Q2) was excluded from their analysis because of the 
relatively short time span. At this point, more formal statistical breakpoint tests could be used 
and would probably result in somewhat different break points, but the empirical results in the 
literature suggest that the breakpoints are close to the change in Fed Chairman.
10
  
 
                                                 
8 See McNees (1986) for an early investigation of policy responses to economic forecasts. The forward-looking 
nature of an optimal Taylor rule was stressed by many; see for example Svensson (1997).  
9 The debate on interest rate smoothing, or its extreme version of interest rate targeting, has a long history and a 
large literature. Common in the Taylor rule literature is the partial adjustment model ∆it = ρ (it* - it-1), where i* 
and i are the Taylor rule target rate and the actually observed rate. Very similar in effect is the error correction 
model ∆it = ρ (it-1* - it-1). For a critical perspective on the issues and debate see for example Rudebusch (2002). 
10 For example, Fuhrer (1996) identified breakpoints in 1974Q1, 1980Q1 and 1986Q1. Estrella and Fuhrer 
(2003) found breakpoints in 1969Q2, 1980Q3, and 1984Q4. Other studies have focused on breaks in the time 
series behavior of the short-term (real) interest rate instead of policy rule coefficients. Estimates of breakpoints 
appear to be sensitive to the variables included in the analysis (see the analysis of Walsh, 1988). 
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Contrary to Judd and Rudebusch, who employ an expanded and dynamic estimation equation, 
I estimate the following basic Taylor rule equation.  
 
ttt yi γπβα ++=  
 
Here, in terms of the original Taylor rule parameters, the estimated coefficients are defined as 
α = (r* - βπ π
T
), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. It can be seen that the coefficient estimates from the 
Taylor rule are not able to pin down both the equilibrium real interest rate (r*) and the 
inflation target rate (π
T
). Following established practice, I will calculate r* as the average of 
the real federal funds rate observed over the relevant sample period. Because the maturity of 
the fed funds rate is very short the current, backward looking inflation rate is used rather than 
actual inflation expectations. In practice, any divergence between actual or ex post and 
expected or ex ante inflation rates is more important for long maturity interest rates. 
Following the estimate of r*, the inflation target π
T
 is calculated as - (α-r*) / (β-1). 
 
Estimating the Taylor rule model requires discussion of some econometric issues. First, there 
are questions with respect to the stationarity of the variables. Interest rates and inflation are 
frequently considered to be non-stationary variables, although the empirical results are mixed 
and depend on the choice of test statistics and sample periods. For all practical purposes, we 
assume here that we can effectively view the basic Taylor rule equation as a cointegration 
equation. At the same time, in view of the relatively short sample periods the use of special 
cointegration estimation methods, relying on asymptotic properties, does not appear to 
provide much benefit. Second, the absence of dynamics in our Taylor equation introduces 
residual serial correlation and the basic model raises questions about possible missing 
variables bias. Aware of the issues related to these problems, I nevertheless proceed to 
estimate the Taylor rule model using basic ordinary least squares and will use Newey-West 
HAC standard errors to correct for residual correlation. 
 
 
Table 2 Taylor rule estimates for Federal Reserve Chairman periods using real time data 
 α β γ adjR
2 SEE DW 
Burns 4.271 
(0.700)a 
0.827 
(0.144)a 
0.440 
(0.116)a 
0.689 1.224 0.836 
 
 r* = 0.49 
πT = 21.88 
     
Volcker 4.366 
(0.986)a 
1.128 
(0.166)a 
-0.005 
(0.099) 
0.658 2.131 1.806 
 r* = 5.11 
πT = 5.79 
     
Greenspan 0.758 
(0.496) 
1.714 
(0.138)a 
0.501 
(0.065)a 
0.786 1.046 0.343 
 r* = 2.49 
πT = 2.43 
     
Estimated Taylor rule equation: ttt yi γπβα ++=  where α = (r* - βπ π
T), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. 
The estimation periods are Burns: 1970Q1-1978Q1, Volcker: 1979Q3-1987Q2 and Greenspan: 1987Q3-
2006Q1. Full period is 1970Q-2006Q1. Real time data on inflation and output gap as discussed in the main text. 
Newey-West HAC standard errors. a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results using real time data on the policy relevant (i.e. mixed 
measure of) inflation and the real time output gap. These data were already discussed earlier. 
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For comparison, alternative results based on a commonly used dataset of current inflation and 
current output gap data is provided in the appendix Table A1. When we compare current and 
real time data estimations, the results for each of the subperiods turn out to be very similar. As 
mentioned before, examination of the current data and real time data suggests that the major 
difference lies in the average level of the output gap, particularly in the first two subperiods of 
our sample. The data differences therefore affect primarily the constant term of the estimated 
Taylor rules. Perhaps worth specific mention is the substantial increase in explanatory power 
of the real time data for the Greenspan period, with the adjusted R
2
 of the equation almost 
doubling in size. 
 
The most important differences in the empirical estimates are found in the comparison 
between the subperiods. One remarkable result is the extremely high implied inflation target 
found for the Burns policy regime, estimated at 22 percent. This result is unlikely to reflect a 
true policy target value. Examination of the inflation and output gap coefficients shows that 
the policy regimes have to be interpreted very carefully. First, both the Burns and Volcker 
regimes suggest that the inflation coefficient is not significantly different from 1. Therefore, 
these estimates suggest that policy makers did not adhere to the so-called Taylor principle, i.e. 
raising the real interest rate when inflation is above its target. This in fact calls into doubt the 
existence of any inflation target. Second, in the Volcker regime there is also no significant 
(positive) response of the policy rate to the output gap. 
 
Whereas the estimated policy rule for the Greenspan period is clearly very close to the Taylor 
rule (with suggested policy rule coefficients of 1.5 and 0.5), the Burns and Volcker periods 
suggest that a different interpretation is more likely. In the Burns regime, the policy rule 
appears to have been to respond with changes in the real funds rate (β=1) to the observed 
output gap (γ>0). Further interpretation based on the value of the constant term suggests that 
the Burns regime does not appear to have had an inflation target at all. The value of the 
constant term appears to capture mostly the value of the equilibrium real interest rate. 
However, the estimated policy rule may be interpreted as reflecting a classical, fixed Phillips-
curve tradeoff between levels of the output gap and levels of corresponding inflation. 
According to the fixed Phillips curve hypothesis, responding to the output gap should be 
sufficient to control inflation as well. On the other hand, the Volcker period policy rule 
appears to have been to keep the real funds rate (β=1) constant and at a relatively high level, 
but not respond to the real economy (γ=0). The high target real funds rate in the Volcker 
period, implied by the constant term, may be interpreted as a function of the communicated 
Fed objective of achieving disinflation in the early 1980s. 
 
To summarize, a likely interpretation of the three policy regimes could be as follows:  
• Burns: real funds rate = f(output gap), no inflation target. 
• Volcker: real funds rate = f(disinflation target), no output gap effect. 
• Greenspan: Taylor rule model. 
 
It is possible to combine the three policy regimes into one comprehensive but relatively 
simple interest rate equation, using dummy variables for the Burns-Miller, Volcker and 
Greenspan periods (DBM, DV, DG). Following some preliminary estimates and tests on 
significance of the dummy variables, a workable real funds rate equation for the full sample 
period would take the following form: 
 
ttttt yDGcyDBMcDGcDGcDVcci *** 22211020100 +++++=− ππ  
10 
 
 
Here, c00 is interpreted to represent the long-run equilibrium real rate common to the three 
policy regimes. Coefficient c01 captures the increase in the target real rate in the Volcker 
regime, aimed at reducing inflation. Coefficient c02 captures the implied target inflation rate in 
the Greenspan regime. 
 
Now, one further addition is made to the interest rate equation. Two dummy variables are 
used for the second and third quarter in 1980 (D80Q2, D80Q3). This captures most of the 
sharp short-run policy reversal in 1980 with respect to interest rate policy and the policy of 
credit controls. The results show that these dummies do not in fact have a large effect on the 
overall equation, except the measure of explanatory power. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates for the simple Federal Reserve policy rule spanning the period 
1970Q1-2006Q1. We find an estimate for the long-run equilibrium real interest rate of 3.44 
percent. For the Greenspan policy regime the average inflation target is estimated at 3.75 
percent, which is substantially higher than the previous subperiod-only estimate of 2.43 
percent reported in Table 2.
11
 For the Greenspan period we again confirm the Taylor rule 
hypothesis with respect to inflation gap and output gap coefficients (β =1.5 and γ = 0.5). 
 
 
Table 3 Federal Reserve policy rule estimate using real time data 
 c00 c01 c02 c1 c21 c22 
Full period 3.440 
(0.582)a 
1.947 
(0.726)a 
-2.683 
(0.794)a 
0.714 
(0.149)a 
0.480 
(0.107)a 
0.501 
(0.068)a 
 adjR2 =  
SEE =  
DW =  
Greenspan  
πT =  
0.729 
1.285 
0.991 
 
3.75 
    
Estimated equation ttttt yDGcyDBMcDGcDGcDVcci *** 22211020100 +++++=− ππ  
Additional included coefficients D80Q2, Q3 not shown. Estimation period is 1970Q1-2006Q1. Greenspan 
period inflation target is calculated as -c02/c1.  
 
 
Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the explanatory performance of two estimated policy 
rules. The first policy rule is the preferred estimate using real time data and includes the 
effects of regime shifts. The other policy rule is the full period estimate of the Taylor equation 
using current data that would frequently be used in other studies. The substantial difference in 
explanatory performance is shown clearly. 
 
The small out-of-sample expansions of the policy rule into 1969Q1-1969Q4 and 2006Q2-
2009Q4 are difficult to evaluate, but at first glance there seems little indication of any further 
regime changes. As a result we may assume that the estimated equation of Table 3, using real 
time data and taking into account the Burns-Miller, Volcker and Greenspan regime changes 
presents a simple but effective representation of Federal Reserve policy for the period 1969-
2009. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Examination of the inflation rate time series suggests that there may have been a shift in the Greenspan 
inflation target around 1991-92. The average level of inflation moves from around 4 percent to 2.5-3 percent.  
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Figure 3 Observed and fitted federal funds rate, 1969Q1-2009Q4 
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Fitted excl.D80: fitted value for the policy rule from Table 3, using real time data, but D80Q2-Q3=0.  
Fitted curr full: fitted value for the policy rule from Table 2, estimated and fitted using current data and no 
regime shifts. Out-of-sample fitted values for 1969Q1-1969Q4 and 2006Q2-2009Q4 are also shown, assuming 
that the Burns-Miller and Greenspan regimes can be extended backward and forward respectively. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I have shown the different results for a basic Taylor rule equation estimated for 
three Federal Reserve monetary policy regimes. The empirical results suggest fundamental 
changes in policy between the tenure periods of Fed Chairman Arthur Burns (1970Q1-
1978Q1), Paul Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Alan Greenspan (1987Q3-1997Q4). The 
Burns regime seems to have focused on changing the real funds rate in response to the output 
gap, without a clear consideration of any inflation target. The Volcker regime consisted of 
keeping the real funds rate at a high constant level, without consideration of the output gap. 
The Greenspan regime closely follows the now familiar Taylor rule principles: increase the 
real funds rate in response to both the inflation gap and output gap. 
 
Despite the fundamental regime shifts, Federal Reserve funds rate policy can still be 
effectively described by a simple equation using only inflation and the output gap, although 
dummy variables are needed to capture the changes in coefficient values. 
 
The cautionary note from this paper is that regime shifts in monetary policy can seriously 
affect several strands of economic analysis. Many empirical studies include monetary policy 
functions at some point in the analysis and their results depend on the accuracy of the policy 
description. It is a problem that so many empirical studies rely on one uniform policy 
equation estimated over the entire sample period and thus ignore the problem of structural 
breaks due to policy regime shifts. Results and conclusions of these simplified empirical 
analyses must be treated with caution. Failure of economic theories in certain empirical tests 
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may reflect not so much the value of the theory but the appropriateness of the model 
assumptions. 
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APPENDIX Table A1 Taylor rule estimates for various periods using current data 
 α β γ adjR
2 SEE DW 
Burns 0.952 
(1.211) 
0.952 
(0.195)a 
0.796 
(0.134)a 
0.641 1.315 0.932 
 
 r* = 0.11 
πT = 17.70 
     
Volcker 4.778 
(0.710)a 
1.098 
(0.125)a 
0.023 
(0.117) 
0.702 1.989 1.928 
 r* = 5.26 
πT = 4.89 
     
Greenspan 1.277 
(1.065) 
1.467 
(0.438)a 
0.649 
(0.140)a 
0.407 1.739 0.068 
 r* = 2.35 
πT = 2.31 
     
Full period 2.820 
(0.864)a 
0.939 
(0.215)a 
0.151 
(0.205) 
0.418 2.662 0.290 
 
 r* = 2.46 
πT = 5.82 
     
Estimated Taylor rule equation: ttt yi γπβα ++=  where α = (r* - βπ π
T), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. 
The estimation periods are Burns: 1970Q1-1978Q1, Volcker: 1979Q3-1987Q2 and Greenspan: 1987Q3-
2006Q1. Full period is 1970Q-2006Q1. Current data for inflation and output gap are based on GNP/GDP 
deflator and CBO potential output (vintage August 2010). 
Newey-West HAC standard errors. a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. 
 
 
  
 
